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1

Congressional Process and Public
Opinion Toward Congress:
An Experimental Analysis Using
the C-SPAN Video Library
Jonathan S. Morris and Michael W. Joy

C

ongress is consistently the least popular branch of government. Nearly
a half century ago Ralph Nader called Congress “the broken branch,”
and that perception has held firm among the public and the media. Even
individual members of Congress take care to distance themselves from the
chronically disliked institution by running against the Congress. Scholars
have examined a number of factors that have been linked to low mass approval of Congress, including negative reactions to congressional policies
(Davidson & Parker, 1972; Fenno, 1975; Parker, 1981; Ramirez, 2013), the
state of the president’s popularity (Patterson & Caldeira, 1990), and public
perceptions of the current state of the economy (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht,
1997; Ramirez, 2013).
Research has also tied low public approval of Congress to the inability
of the membership to live up to the public’s overall expectations (Kimball
& Patterson, 1997) and the institution’s tendency to engage in largely
1
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unpopular—although democratic—political processes, such as extensive
debate, excessive partisanship, conflict, and compromise (Binder, 2003, 2015;
Doherty, 2015; Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
1995, 2002; Mann & Ornstein, 2006, 2012; Ramirez, 2009; Sinclair, 2011).
Also, recent computerized sentiment analysis has linked the decline of prosocial language on the floor to the erosion of congressional approval over time
(Frimer, Aquino, Gerbauer, Zhu, & Oakes, 2015).
Outside the arena of policy and process, researchers have pointed at
congressional scandals, involving one or more members of Congress, as a
major factor in damaging the institution’s reputation (Bowler & Karp, 2004;
McDermott, Schwartz, & Valleho, 2015; Rozell, 1994; Sabato, Stencel, &
Lichter, 2000).
The televised images of Congress in the media are of particular importance in understanding opinion regarding the institution’s actions and behavior. While some Americans have experience dealing with their own congressional representatives (see Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; Fenno, 1978;
Mayhew, 1974), their impressions of the performance of the membership as
a whole as well as the institution are grounded primarily in what they have
seen on television (Arnold, 2004).
Since 1979, the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network (C-SPAN) has provided gavel-to-gavel coverage of floor proceedings as well as coverage of congressional committee hearings and press events on television. The C-SPAN
Video Library has captured all of this coverage and made it available for public use. The archive, along with its sophisticated online cataloging and indexing system, provides an unprecedented view into the institution of Congress
(Browning, 2014; Frantzich & Sullivan, 1996). From a research perspective,
C-SPAN’s 30 years of archived congressional proceedings constitutes the most
complete and publicly accessible accounting of government activity to date.
While these data have been used to examine congressional activity and public
opinion toward the institution (Morris, 2001; Morris & Witting, 2001), there
is still much knowledge that can be gained from the valuable resources provided by the C-SPAN Video Library.
The intent of this project is to use the valuable resource of the C-SPAN
Video Library to improve our understanding of how Americans react to
Congress on television. Using the C-SPAN Video Library, we construct an
experimental analysis that examines how subjects respond to congressional
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floor process in the House and Senate. The valuable search and editing tools
provided by the C-SPAN Video Library provide a unique opportunity to investigate Congress experimentally—an approach which is seldom employed
in congressional research.
Overall, our study is an exploration into the public’s reaction to floor
activity. Our exploration is grounded in the notion that not all floor activity
is the same. Specifically, we focus on two different aspects of the legislative
process on the floor: partisanship and legislative maneuvering. Our findings
show that subjects react negatively to both types of processes, but the degree
of these reactions differs. We discuss our findings in the context of how congressional actors can influence how the institution is perceived by the masses.

The Legislative Process and Public Opinion Toward Congress
Unlike the presidency, the courts, and even nongovernmental institutions
where the deliberative process takes place largely away from public view, the
U.S. Congress and its proceedings are relatively wide-open for public display.
On any given day on Capitol Hill, committee hearings are open to the public,
hours of floor debate are captured on C-SPAN, and dozens of press conferences are held. All of these events work to make the congressional process a
virtual open book.
From a public-opinion standpoint, however, this openness has consequences. Past research has claimed that the average American does not respond
positively to the sight of gridlock, legislative red tape, or seemingly endless
political debate (Binder, 2003, 2015; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995). On the
contrary, many Americans often take delight at the thought of benevolent political leaders who take quick, decisive action for the public good (Altemeyer,
1988; Adorno, 1950; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Congress, however, was
designed precisely to thwart such action. Thus, when Congress performs its
constitutional role of meticulously debating political issues and events, the
American public tends to respond negatively (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht,
1997). The institution was designed to promote extensive deliberation and factional conflict. This design makes Congress the most democratic institution in
the national government. The research has found that Americans love the idea
of democracy in theory, but do not like to see the process play out in action.
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In short, the public has a lack of appreciation for the legislature’s highly deliberative role in the American democratic process. Instead, Americans would
prefer a stealth democracy where the political process is accessible yet hidden
from the public’s sight and left to trustworthy leaders (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse,
2002). Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) sum up this popular perception:
[Americans] dislike compromise and bargaining, they dislike committees and bureaucracy, they dislike political parties and interest
groups, they dislike big salaries and big staffs, they dislike slowness
and multiple stages, and they dislike debate and publicly hashing
things out, referring to such actions as haggling or bickering. (18)
The degree to which the masses respond negatively to process has been
debated. Many scholars argue that policy outcomes are the primary indicator
of views toward Congress (Easton, 1965; Jones, 2013; Jones & McDermott,
2009; Wlezien & Carman, 2001). For instance, a recent study by Harbridge
and Malhotra (2011) finds that public disdain for a bipartisan process is outweighed by individual-level partisan policy preferences. This reflects the larger
notion that elite behavior does not have much influence on the views of the
mass public (Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005).
On the other side of the argument, researchers contend that public reactions to legislative process can actually supersede the policy issues and the
outcomes (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995).
Ramirez (2009) concluded that the public’s desire to mitigate procedural partisan conflict among legislators is more important than the substance of policy
actions. Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) find partisan conflict reduces public
support for Congress, but also note that the partisan public responds favorably to their own representatives who act in a partisan manner.
Regardless of the degree to which public disdain for legislative process
plays a role in shaping mass opinion of Congress, the evidence supports the
notion that it is significant. However, what exactly is the legislative process,
and how is it measured? While the definitions of the legislative process varies slightly, almost all contain the same core concepts. These concepts include
open disagreement of competing interests, compromise, inefficiency, and
some degree of adherence to procedural norms (Crick, 1992; Durr, Gilmour,
& Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995; Ramirez, 2009).
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There is, however, a shortcoming in the current understanding of how
legislative process is conceptualized and measured. Specifically, the existing
studies have not fully examined the notion that legislative process on the
floor of Congress can vary dramatically. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995,
2002) relied primarily on focus groups and cross-sectional survey data to
show a general disdain for the process-related issues that are commonplace
in Congress. Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997) used time-series analysis
to show that mass support for Congress tends to drop when major legislation is under consideration on Capitol Hill. Their measurement of process,
however, was dependent on the number of major bills under consideration
in Congress, as well as the number of presidential vetoes and subsequent veto
overrides. The assumption was that process issues are visible to the American
public during times of action on major legislation. When there is no major
legislation under consideration, the assumption was that process issues are
off the American public’s radar screen. Ramirez (2009) relied strictly on the
number of partisan-oriented votes in Congress to determine the visibility of
process to the masses.
However, the legislative process in not monolithic, and thus should not
be conceptualized or measured as such. Legislative conflict on the floor is not
the same as the procedural wrangling that is discussion of committee hearings, markups, and amendments. Who is to say the public’s response would
be uniform? The most significant shortcoming of earlier studies on public reactions to process is that the nature of the legislative process had been somewhat oversimplified. Likewise, generalizations regarding the public’s reaction
to process may have been oversimplified as well. A more detailed examination
of the specific elements of legislative process in Congress may provide greater
understanding of how the American public reacts. Because the research into
this topic has mostly examined aggregate opinion of the legislative process,
we lack more detailed analysis at the individual level.
We thus propose to examine two unique aspects of the legislative process on the floor of the United States Congress: conflict between parties and
legislative maneuvering. While it is clear that conventional wisdom suggests both of these process elements prompt negative responses from the
public, they deserve to be examined separately. Likewise, a comparison is
warranted. While conflict and legislative maneuvering have been conflated,
some content-analysis research suggests that the media cover these process
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elements differently (Morris & Clawson, 2005). Specifically, legislative maneuvering is more prevalent in mainstream media coverage (70%) than partisan conflict (33%, categories not mutually exclusive). These elements certainly overlap with frequency, but they are often presented to the masses in
different contexts.
Based on the preceding discussion, our intent is to explore the effect of
exposure to congressional partisan conflict as well the effect of exposure to
legislative maneuvering. We will investigate how individuals respond to these
process elements singularly, and we will examine responses to both elements
simultaneously. In the section below, we discuss how we collected samples of
congressional partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering from C-SPAN.
We will then discuss how these samples were used in a controlled online experiment.

Capturing Partisan Conflict and Legislative Maneuvering on C-SPAN
The public availability of video from the C-SPAN Video Library allows the
ability to search through congressional floor debate. The indexing tool within
each day of coverage allows the ability to search for specific types of floor action, including amendments, motions, and references to committee reports.
The same tool also allows the ability to locate usage of unconstrained floor
time, which includes one-minute speeches, five-minute speeches, and special
orders. Using these tools, we were able to locate an array of floor behavior that
exemplified both partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering. The C-SPAN
Video Library clipping feature also allows selected video to be captured and
downloaded for editing. This gave us the opportunity to peruse a wide array of
coverage that typifies both partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering. The
sophistication of these online search and editing tools provides researchers
a unique ability to acquire footage of the congressional institution in many
forms. Certainly, this is ideal for experimental analysis of Congress—an area
of research that borders on nonexistent.
From these scores of selected clips, we first settled on six partisan speeches
from unconstrained floor time in the U.S. House of Representatives—three
from the Republicans and three from the Democrats. These speeches constituted the conflict element of legislative process. Combined, these clips

Congressional Process and Public Opinion Toward Congress 7

were 6 minutes and 34 seconds long. In order to control for variations in the
demographics of the speakers, we chose to use only clips of White males.
Additionally, we chose speeches delivered from the well of the House floor,
thus allowing for similar camera angles. Finally, we controlled for substance
by including speeches that only spoke of pending budget legislation offered
by the House Republicans and Democrats. Below is a transcript of a sample
partisan conflict video:
Mr. Speaker, today Americans are working more and earning less. The
cost of college is rising, young people are in debt and America’s infrastructure is in decay. Mr. Speaker, the Republican budget does nothing to help struggling Americans, it gives tax breaks to the wealthy,
ends the Medicare guarantee, makes it harder for Americans to buy
a home, and cuts funding for education. Our military leaders even
testified that the Republican budget will put the lives of our men
and woman in uniform at risk. Mr. Speaker, this is outrageous, the
American people elected us, we owe them to pass a budget that addresses their needs, keeps them safe, and gives them the best opportunity possible to live the American dream. Let’s focus on creating
good-paying jobs, providing universal pre-K, and restoring food
stamps programs that have helped many American families through
these tough times, and let’s ensure that our military has the resources
they need to make sure they can fight the fight that America wants.
Democrats will keep standing with the American people and do the
job they were elected to do on behalf of the American people.
Second, we selected three separate clips of members of Congress discussing legislative maneuvering. These clips made little reference to substantive
policy issues. Instead, these were discussions from both the House and Senate
floor that were procedural in nature. There was no mention of partisanship,
either. The only evidence of partisanship was in the “R” or “D” attached to the
name of the speaker on the bottom of the screen. Similarly, policy was only
mentioned in the title of the bills and reports discussed. As was the case with
the partisan-conflict video, this video contained only White male speakers.
In total, the video was 5 minutes and 18 seconds in length. See the following excerpt:
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Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only I yield the customary
thirty minutes to the gentlewoman from New York, Ms. Slaughter.
I yield myself such time as I may consume, and ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks and insert extraneous material in the record.
Speaker: Without objection, so ordered.
During consideration of the resolution, all time is yielded for
the purpose of debate only. Last night the Rules Committee met
and granted a modified closed rule for H.R. 10, the Comprehensive
Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of 2001. The rule provides for ninety minutes of general debate, with sixty minutes equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and the ranking member
of the Committee on Ways and Means, and thirty minutes equally
divided and controlled by the Chairman and Ranking Member of
the Committee on Education and the Work Force. Additionally, the
rule waives all points of order against consideration of the bill, and
against consideration of the amendment printed in the report. The
rule provides that in lieu of the amendments recommended by the
Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee on Education
of the Work Force, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the Congressional Record and numbered one shall be considered as adopted. The rule also provides for consideration of the
amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the rules committee report. If offered by Representative Rangel or his designee,
which shall be considered as read and separately debatable for one
hour equally divided and controlled by a proponent and an opponent. Finally the rule provides for one motion to recommit with or
without instructions.
A third video was constructed as an abbreviated compilation of the preceding videos. This contained four of the six partisan videos (two Democrats,
two Republicans) and half of the process-element videos. This clip was 8 minutes long. Each of the three videos can be viewed as edited at the following web
locations: http://www.politicalresearchlab.org/clip1.html; http://www.political
researchlab.org/clip2.html; and http://www.politicalresearchlab.org/clip3.html
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Research Design and Methods
We used the three videos discussed above to create posttest-only control group
experimental analysis, in which subjects watched a video and took a brief online posttest questionnaire. Condition One was partisan conflict, Condition
Two was legislative maneuvering, and Condition Three was a combination
of partisanship and maneuvering. The fourth condition is a control group.
Subjects were recruited into the experimental pool via Amazon.com’s
Mechanical Turk, which allows requesters (in this case the researchers) to
hire workers (in this case the subjects) to complete short tasks, typically for
minimal fees. This service has become popular among experimental social
scientists for the purpose of subject recruitment beyond the typical usage of
voluntary student subjects. While this subject pool lacks the generalizability
of randomly selected participants, research has suggested that Mechanical
Turk’s samples “will often be more diverse than [other] convenience samples
and will always be more diverse than student samples” (Berinsky, Huber, &
Lenz, 2012, p. 361; see also Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).
Our subjects were paid $0.50 each for participation in the experiment,
and randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. To control for validity,
subjects were only permitted to participate a single time in a single condition.
Additionally, in order to ensure that subjects assigned to Conditions One
through Three actually did experience the experimental stimuli (the video
in full), we included two filter questions on the posttest questionnaire. The
first question asked, “Where was the video you just watched taking place?”
Response options included a sporting event, a music concert, Congress, or a
farm equipment convention. Subjects who answered incorrectly were excluded
from participation. The second filter question was tied to the content of the
videos. Specifically, the last few seconds of the video showed a screen shot that
said, “Remember this number: 12.” In the survey, subjects were asked, “Which
number was shown at the end of the video you just watched?” Subjects who
answered incorrectly had the option to go back and watch the video again, and
were allowed to continue if they got the question correct on the next chance. In
order to prevent subjects from skipping to the end of each video, the videos were
posted using technology that prevented subjects from simply skipping to the
end and observing the number. In short, we did all we could in order to make
certain the subjects did indeed watch the videos they were assigned to watch.
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The primary independent variable was the experimental condition to
which the subjects were exposed. Additional independent variables were
collected from the posttest survey as well. These variables included age, race,
gender, education, income, and partisan identification. See the Appendix to
this chapter for measurement details.
Multiple dependent variables were collected as well. The first was a general question that assessed the subjects’ perception of Congress as a whole:
“On a scale of 1–10, how do you feel about the U.S. Congress? The higher the
number, the more favorably you feel toward the U.S. Congress. The lower the
number, the less favorably you feel toward the U.S. Congress. An answer of
5 would indicate you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably toward the U.S.
Congress. Click the number that best corresponds to your feelings.” The second set of dependent variables was collected by asking respondents to agree
or disagree with a number of statements about Congress, congressional parties, and the ability of the parties and factions in Congress to work together
(1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree;
4 = somewhat agree; 5 = strongly agree). These statements are listed in the
Appendix to this chapter. In the following section, we outline the findings
from our experiment and discuss the results.

Findings
Table 1.1 displays a set of ordinary least squares regressions in which the
dependent variables are thermometer scores toward Congress, President
Obama, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party (1 to 10 scale). These
models were run only on the control group, and use the following basic predictors of approval: party identification, gender, education, income, ideology,
race and age. Unlike feelings toward the president, the Democrats, and the
Republicans, it is clear that feelings toward Congress are much less predictable.
None of the standard predictors are statistically significant, not even partisan
identification or ideology—even though Republicans control both chambers.
The low adjusted R-squared (.07) compared to the others illustrates this point.
In order to examine the effect of the experimental stimuli on feelings toward Congress, variables for Condition 1, 2, and 3 were added into the model
for Congress. Each condition was generated as a dummy variable in which 1 =
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Table 1.1 Thermometer Scores (1–10) Control Group Only
Variable

Congress

President
Obama

Democratic
Party

Republican
Party

Party ID

-.22 (.17)

-.83 (.17)**

-.98 (.16)**

.57 (.15)**

Male

-1.14 (.33)**

-.15 (.33)

-.73 (.31)*

-.57 (.29)

Education

.07 (.14)

.06 (.14)

-.09 (.13)

.12 (.13)

Income

.08 (.07)

.22 (.07)**

.16 (.07)*

.04 (.06)

Conservative/Liberal

-.44 (.26)

.72 (.25)**

.29 (.24)

-.79 (.22)**

White

.10 (.47)

-.71 (.46)

.35 (.43)

.08 (.41)

Age

-.02 (.01)

-.00 (.01)

-.00 (.01)

-.03 (.01)

Constant

6.67 (1.59)**

N

172

172

172

172

Adj. R-Squared

.07

.53

.51

.48

5.60 (1.56)** 7.73 (1.46)** 4.60 (1.39)**

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Table 1.2 Thermometer Scores Toward Congress by Experimental Condition
Variable

Thermometer Score (1–10)

Partisan Condition

-.01(.23)

Legislative Maneuvering

.17(.23)

Combination

.07(.23)

Party ID

-.10(.08)

Male

-.64(.16)**

Education

-.07(.07)

Income

.02(.04)

Conservative/Liberal

-.31(.13)*

White

-.38(.21)

Age

-.02(.01)*

Constant

6.54(.82)*

N

694

Adj. R-Squared

.04

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares coefficients with
standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
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exposure to that condition and 0 = no exposure to that condition. The control
condition is the excluded category in the regression. Table 1.2 displays the results. These results show conclusively that neither exposure to partisan conflict
nor legislative maneuvering significantly influenced the dependent variable of
feelings toward Congress. Table 1.3 confirms these null results in an ordered
logistic regression model in which overall approval for Congress was the dependent variable (1 = strongly disapprove; 2 = somewhat disapprove; 3 = neither approve nor disapprove; 4 = somewhat approve; 5 = strongly approve).
Table 1.3 Overall Approval for Congress by Experimental Condition
Variable

Approval

Partisan Condition

-.12(.20)

Legislative Maneuvering

.06(.20)

Combination

-11(.21)

Party ID

.02(.07)

Male

-.59(.15)**

Education

-.01(.06)

Income

.00(.03)

Conserv./Liberal

-.17(.11)

White

-.45(.19)*

age

-.02(.01)***

N

694

Constant 1

-2.60

Constant 2

-.88

Constant 3

.16

Constant 4

2.39

Chi-Squared

47.11

Log Likelihood

-853.61

Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors
in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

What about perceptions of the ability of congressional factions to work
together in Washington? Did the experimental stimuli have an influence?
We address this question by asking respondents in the posttest to disagree or
agree with the following statements: (1) “I believe that the liberals and conservatives in Congress can put aside their differences to do what is best for
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America,” (2) “The liberals in Congress don’t seem willing to work with the
conservatives,” and (3) “The conservatives in Congress don’t seem willing to
work with liberals” (1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither
agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat agree; 5 = strongly agree). These items were
regressed against exposure to experimental condition and the control variables in an ordered logit analysis. The results are presented in Table 1.4. As it
can be seen, the experimental stimuli did not significantly influence perceptions of the two sides of Congress to work together.
Table 1.4 Perceptions of Cooperation and Government
Variable

Agree With Statement (1 = strongly disagree . . . 5 = strongly agree)
Liberals and
conservatives
can put
disagreements
aside

Liberals in
Congress don’t
seem willing
to work with
conservatives

Conservatives in
Congress don’t
seem willing
to work with
liberals

Conflict

.04(.19)

-.08(.20)

.02(.20)

Legislative Maneuvering

.24(.20)

.08(.20)

-.09(.21)

Both

.17(.20)

-.21(.20)

-.11(.21)

Knowledge

-.08(.05)

.02(.04)

.16(.05)**

Party ID

-.06(.07)

.30(.07)**

-.06(.08)

Male

-.41(.14)**

-.14(.15)

-.05(.15)

Education

-.08(.06)

-.06(.07)

.00(.07)

Income

.02(.03)

-.02(.04)

.03(.04)

Conservative/Liberal

-.01(.11)

-.62(.12)**

.45(.12)**

White

-.45(.18)*

.22(.18)

.60(.19)**

Age

.01(.01)

.00(.01)

.00(.01)

N

694

694

694

Constant 1

-2.59

-3.96

-1.38

Constant 2

-1.28

-2.48

.21

Constant 3

-.56

-1.68

1.25

Constant 4

.85

.00

2.77

Chi-Squared

29.18**

235.12**

81.49**

Log Likelihood

-1,080.45

-952.58

-854.84

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01
(two-tailed)
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Overall, the results from the first set of analyses reported in Tables 1.1
through 1.4 indicate that exposure to congressional partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering do not significantly impact perceptions of Congress as
a whole or the perception of the ability of the membership to work together.
But were there other reactions that shed light on the differential reactions to
congressional partisanship versus legislative maneuvering? The findings from
Table 1.5 demonstrate how exposure to the experimental stimuli influenced
individuals’ perception of their own understanding of politics and government, also referred to as internal political efficacy (Niemi, Craig, & Mattei,
1991). The results clearly show that partisan conflict has no effect on internal efficacy, but the legislative-maneuvering condition has a significant negative impact. That is, individuals who witnessed legislative maneuvering were
much more likely to agree that “sometimes politics and government seem so
complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s happening.”
Also, the combination of legislative maneuvering and partisan conflict has
the same effect, but to a lesser extent.
While internal political efficacy is an individual’s perception of the individual’s ability to comprehend politics, external political efficacy is the perception of how political figures react to them (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990).
In other words, how responsive does an individual feel governmental figures
are to the individual’s own wishes? In order to measure this concept, we included two items in the posttest that asked subjects to agree or disagree with
statements about members of Congress. The first statement read, “I don’t
think members of Congress care much what people like me think,” and the
second read, “People like me don’t have any say about what Congress does”
(1 = strongly disagree; 2 = somewhat disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; 4 = somewhat agree; and 5 = strongly agree). We combined these two
responses to create an additive index ranging from 2 to 10. Due to the nature
of the measurement, higher values reflected lower levels of external efficacy
toward Congress. For ease of interpretation, we reversed the coding so that
2 = lowest external efficacy and 10 = highest external efficacy.
Table 1.6 illustrates the effect of our experimental stimuli on external efficacy toward Congress. If we relax our expectation of statistical significance to
p ≤ .10, it can be seen that there appears to be a positive effect when it comes
to exposure to partisan conflict and the combination of partisan conflict and
legislative maneuvering. In other words, individuals who witnessed partisan

Congressional Process and Public Opinion Toward Congress 15

Table 1.5 Internal Political Efficacy
Variable

Agree That Politics and Government Seem Complicated
(1 = strongly disagree . . . 5 = strongly agree)

Conflict

.09(.19)

Legislative Maneuvering

1.13(.20)**

Both

.49(.20)*

Knowledge

-.32(.05)**

Party ID

-.01(.07)

Male

-.54(.14)**

Education

-.08(.06)

Income

.07(.03)*

Conservative/Liberal

-.07(.11)

White

-.21(.19)

Age

.01(.01)*

N

694

Constant 1

-2.79

Constant 2

-1.36

Constant 3

-.80

Constant 4

.97

Chi-Squared

117.89**

Log Likelihood

-1,015.77

Note: Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

conflict were less cynical about the responsiveness of Congress than those
in the control group. The legislative-maneuvering condition, however, failed
to reach statistical significance, again illustrating a differential impact across
different elements of legislative process.
Were there other differential emotional responses to the experimental stimuli? The findings from Table 1.7 strongly suggest that there is a significant difference. Each participant in Conditions 1 through 3 was asked to report how the
videos of Congress made them feel. The response options were (a) interested,
(b) uninterested, (c) frustrated, (d) angry, (e) happy, and (f) none of the above.
Subjects were permitted to click as many feelings that applied. Table 1.7 shows
the effects of the partisan conflict on emotions relative to legislative maneuvering,
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Table 1.6 External Political Efficacy
Variable

External Efficacy
(2 = lowest . . . 10 = highest)

Conflict

.39(.22)*

Legislative Maneuvering

.36(.22)

Both

.41(.22)*

Knowledge

-.02(.05)

Party ID

-.14(.08)*

Male

-.22(.16)

Education

.01(.07)

Income

.06(.04)

Conservative/Liberal

-.26(.12)**

White

-.38(.21)*

Age

-.00(.01)

Constant

5.72(.79)**

N

694

Adj. R-Squared

.01

Note: Cell entries are ordinary least squares regression coefficients
with standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .10, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)

Table 1.7 Emotional Responses to Clips (Partisan-Conflict and Legislative-Maneuvering Groups Only)
Variable

Interested

Uninterested

Frustrated

Angry

Conflict

1.14(.26)**

-2.14(.28)**

1.41(.25)**

1.45(.37)**

Party ID

-.22(.14)

.50(.14)**

-.04(.13)

-.10(.18)

Male

.23(.25)

-.25(.26)

-.29(.24)

.83(.33)*

Education

-.04(.11)

.04(.11)

.16(.11)

.06(.15)

Income

-.10(.06)

.01(.07)

.02(.06)

-.05(.08)

Conservative/Liberal

-.05(.21)

.45(.22)*

.07(.19)

.14(.14)

White

-.45(.30)

.11(.33)

.43(.31)

.42(.42)

Age

-.00(.01)

-.05(.01)

.03(.01)

-.00(.01)

Constant

.57(1.42)

-.94(1.46)

-3.46(1.34)**

-3.64(1.89)

N

349

349

349

349

Chi-Squared

39.40**

99.36**

46.23**

33.61**

Log Likelihood

-199.32

-187.55

-215.88

-131.84

Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)
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which is the excluded category. The combination condition and the control group
were dropped from this analysis. Note that “happy” and “none of the above” are
not included due to the extreme rarity of that response (only three respondents
reported feeling happy or none of the above). They demonstrate starkly different
emotional reactions. In short, partisan conflict drew much more interest from
the subjects than legislative maneuvering. At the same time, partisan conflict
was significantly more likely to arouse frustration and anger among viewers.

Conclusion
Our study contributes to the current understanding of public responses to
Congress by exploring reactions to unique elements of the legislative process
on the floor. Although perceptions of Congress as a whole are fairly stable in
the face of exposure to congressional partisan conflict and legislative maneuvering on the floor of Congress, we discovered unique emotional responses.
While it is not generally thought that exposure to Congress in action on
C-SPAN would provoke emotion among viewers, our results suggest otherwise. Legislative maneuvering is associated with decreased external efficacy,
but not internal efficacy. Exposure to partisan conflict, on the other hand,
generates more interest among viewers and is tied to higher levels of external efficacy toward Congress. This is a compelling result in the context of our
findings that exposure to the partisan-conflict condition of our experiment is
also associated with much higher levels of anger and frustration.
The idea that exposure to partisanship on the House floor is tied to more
positive views toward any aspect of Congress is in contrast to conventional
wisdom on the topic (Durr, Gilmour, & Wolbrecht, 1997; Hibbing & TheissMorse, 1995; Ramirez, 2009). Why may this be the case? Perhaps the public
is not entirely sure what it wants from government (Ladd, 1983, 1990). This,
Everett Ladd argues, sets the stage for a “cognitive Madisonianism” among
the masses, where conflict between tenacious actors with divergent views on
the role of government is welcomed (1990). Individually, most Americans
would decry the perils of a Congress mired in gridlock, but the public as a
whole may have a more accommodating view on the matter. David Mayhew
(1996) follows this logic and cautiously proposes the notion that Americans
as a collective find partisan tension at the federal level comforting.
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From this perspective, policy outcomes may not be as important to the
public as the image that congressional actors are fulfilling their representative
function by engaging in conflict. When conflict is less apparent to the public,
larger stereotypes of a do-nothing Congress are more likely to take hold on
the masses. As Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2001) note, “People want decision
making to be a balance between elected officials and ordinary people, but they
think they are getting a process dominated by officeholders” (p. 152). In other
words, a Congress devoid of conflict is a Congress in collusion with itself and
the special interests. While it is unconventional to suggest that Congress may
improve its image by conducting more vigorous partisan debate over the issues, our exploration warrants further study. We urge future researchers to
at least take this possibility under consideration.
Furthermore, we wish to encourage greater usage of the C-SPAN Video
Library as a resource. Experimental research is the key to gaining a more nuanced understanding of how the public feels about the United States Congress.
The vast majority of work on public opinion toward Congress has relied on survey data. If we wish to understand the affective responses individuals have to
Congress, further experimental studies should be employed. The C-SPAN Video
Library is the most valuable resource available to researchers in this regard.
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